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Back in October 2022, as Rishi Sunak took over as the UK's leader, he was the fifth UK leader to occupy the position in six years.

Unleashed on the UK by Britain's EU exit, this represented unprecedented political turmoil. So how might we describe what is occurring in the French Republic, now on its sixth premier in two years – with three in the last ten months?

The current premier, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, abandoning Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in return for opposition Socialist votes as the price for his government’s survival.

But it is, in the best case, a short-term solution. The EU’s second-largest economy is locked in a political permacrisis, the likes of which it has not experienced for many years – possibly not since the start of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no easy escape.

Governing Without a Majority

Essential context: ever since Macron initiated an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, France has had a hung parliament separated into three warring blocs – left, the far right and his own centrist coalition – none with anything close to a majority.

At the same time, the country faces twin financial emergencies: its national debt level and deficit are now almost twice the EU limit, and hard constitutional deadlines to approve a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are approaching.

In this challenging environment, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who lasted from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.

In mid-September, the leader named his trusted associate Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he encountered anger from allies and opponents alike.

So much so that the next day, he resigned. After just 27 days in office, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in recent French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “partisan attitudes” and “certain egos” would make his job virtually unworkable.

Another twist in the tale: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for two more days in a last-ditch effort to salvage cross-party backing – a task, to put it gently, filled with challenges.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs openly criticized the struggling leader. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and radical left France Unbowed (LFI) declined to engage with Lecornu, promising to vote down all future administrations unless there were early elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, engaging with all willing listeners. At the end of his 48 hours, he appeared on television to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to avoid elections. The president’s office confirmed the president would appoint a new prime minister 48 hours later.

Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So this week – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the country’s rival political parties were “fuelling division” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Could he survive – and can he pass that vital budget?

In a critical address, the young prime minister outlined his financial plans, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were expecting: Macron’s flagship reform would be frozen until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already on board, the Socialists said they would refuse to support no-confidence motions tabled against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the government should survive those votes, scheduled for Thursday.

It is, however, by no means certain to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS clearly stated that it would be demanding further compromises. “This,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”

A Cultural Shift

The issue is, the greater concessions he makes to the left, the more opposition he'll face from the right. And, like the PS, the right-leaning parties are themselves split on dealing with the administration – some are still itching to topple it.

A look at the seat numbers shows how tough Lecornu’s task – and longer-term survival – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR seek his removal.

To succeed, they need a majority of 288 votes in parliament – so if they can persuade just 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 representatives (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in two years is, similar to his forerunners, toast.

Most expect this to occur soon. Although, by some miracle, the divided parliament summons up the collective responsibility to pass a budget by year-end, the outlook afterward look grim.

So does an exit exist? Snap elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: polls suggest pretty much every party bar the RN would see reduced representation, but there would remain no decisive majority. A fresh premier would confront identical numerical challenges.

An alternative might be for Macron himself to resign. After a presidential vote, his successor would dissolve parliament and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the following election. But that, too, is uncertain.

Surveys show the future president will be Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that French electorate, having chosen a far-right leader, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.

In the end, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its leaders accept the new political reality, which is that clear majorities are a thing of the past, winner-takes-all no longer applies, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.

Numerous observers believe that transformation will not be possible under the existing governmental framework. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.

“The system wasn't built to encourage – and even disincentivizes – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”